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Abstract
Code Obfuscation is a protection technique that transforms the software into
a semantically equivalent one which is strenuous to reverse engineer. As a part of
software protection and security, code obfuscation got commercial interest from
both vendors’ side to keep their proprietary as secret and customers’ side to have
a trusted software that don’t leek or destroy their personal information. Today
most of the software distributions contain complete source code in the form of
machine code, which are easy to decompile and increase the risk of malicious
reverse engineering.
The basic idea of the obfuscating technique that has been described in this
research work is to hide the proprietary code section through preventive design
obfuscation and insertion of self-modifying code at binary level. In this proposed
technique the combination, while complementing each other, provides protection
against all kind of reverse engineering.
Keywords: Software Protection, Reverse Engineering, Vendor, Decompile,
Control obfuscation, Code Splitting, Self-modifying code.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
From the development of operating system to till now, software industry creates its
own space in research, science and business. Softwares become the most desirable
part of the digital world. Not only computers almost all the electronics devices
have softwares embedded within them or installed on them. To hold this digital
market software vendors started to put their proprietary code or algorithms as
a secret part of the softwares and distribute in the form of executables without
the source code. Alongside this evolution of the softwares make them complex to
other people to understand the executables. Even it is difficult for the developer
to maintain, to update and to patch new add-ons on client and customer side.
This creates the need of software analyzing tools like disassembler, de-compilation
[1] tools, reverse engineering [2] tools and many others. This analyzing tools
again create a new threat for software industries - the stealing of the intellectual
properties like code sections or algorithms.
Though these analyzing tools are the most essential part of software develop-
ment life cycle phases [3], specially for testing, maintenance and up-gradations,
these tools are also getting used for reverse engineering aiming at malicious inten-
tion of steeling or exploring the intellectual properties or vulnerabilities. These
kind of software analyzing tools are largely available [4–7] on websites with docu-
mentation.
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1.1 Reverse engineering attacks
The Reverse engineering [8] is the process of analyzing a target system to uniquely
identify the system’s modules and relationships between them and create a repre-
sentations of the target system in another form or at a higher level of abstraction.
In software world the reverse engineering method has been widely used in code
reuse, software testing [9], to identify vulnerabilities [10], to analyze malicious
codes [11] and protocols [12]. But the hackers and crackers are using this reverse
engineering for their wicked purposes like code theft, code tampering, crack and
piracy as shown in Figure 1.1, which is a open challenge to software proprietary
informations protection. These kind of illegal activities cause the loss of money,
business, reputation and the trust factor of the vendors.
Figure 1.1: Attacks by Reverse Engineering
In the battle of software market every organizations have their proprietary
codes or algorithms built into the executables which are sold to the customer.
Which will be executed on untrusted computing environment where attacker have
complete access to the software and hardware. Therefore, in such kind of environ-
ment software protection [13] is a definite need but harder to handle. Several cases
of software law suits are filed, involving intellectual property theft using reverse
engineering, like Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc. [14] in 1992,
Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. v. Connectix Corp. [15] in 2000, in 2002 the
case of Blizzard Entertainment on bnetd, which is claimed as a software package
that was developed by reverse engineer the Blizzard Entertainment’s Battle.net,a
online multiplayer gaming service, poses almost equal workings [16].
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1.2 Protection techniques for software intellec-
tual properties
From these it is prominent that the protection of intellectual properties is a crit-
ical issue for the vendors while capturing customers with new technologies, with
new software is the aim of the every software vendors, but to protect their new
ideas they need copyright or patent. Even after if the ideas is copied somewhere
else then again there will be court cases. It will be then investigated by technical
experts. In order to perform such investigation several software tools, mathe-
matical models and theoretical frameworks like SMAT [17] [18], MOSS [19] [18],
AFC(Abstraction-Filtering-Comparison) [20] [18] and others are followed. In such
theoretical framework (eg. AFC) the expertise first have to create an abstrac-
tion [18] depends upon purpose of the code, program structure and architecture,
modules, source code & object code, then depending on these abstraction the
expertise again have to compare [18] data structure, algorithms, system calls, for-
mating, macros, bugs, execution paths, error, language to create a proper report.
But still the evidence collected by the technical experts is open to legal challenges
irrespective of the outcome which may produce delay in the process of litigation.
All of these are time consuming, we have to also take into the monetary factors
and above all the perfection of the thorough, authentic and convincing report of
the technical expert in interest of proper justice. Both patenting and filing case
on copy is not possible for small or medium size organizations or software vendors
for all of their intellectual properties. This introduce the other technique of soft-
ware protection like code obfuscation [21], software water marking [22], Tamper
Proofing [22], white box cryptography [23], software fingerprinting [22], software
diversification [24].
Some of the above named techniques are mainly to avoid reverse engineering
by making its execution difficult or force it to crash on analyze & tampering and
some of them creates special copyright key depending on execution path or provide
security keys to identify theft.
Software watermarking [22] involves embedding a unique identifier or signature
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within a piece of software. Watermarking does not prevent theft but instead
discourages the stealing of codes by providing a way to uniquely identify the
origin of the stolen software.
Watermark embedding : Program x Signature x Key → Watermarked program
Watermark extraction : Watermarked program x Key → Signature
Tamper proofing [22] are used to stop the execution of our software if it has
been altered by adding tamper-proofing code to the software that will detect any
change in code and cause the execution to a dead state or fail state.
Software Diversification [24] is a technique that generates different, but seman-
tically equivalent, assembly instruction from a code sequence.
Software fingerprinting [22] is more or less same as above where the software
vendors add a unique customer identification number for each distributed copy to
track copyright violation.
Figure 1.2: Protection of Intellectual Properties
All these methods are to protect the software piracy after reverse engineer-
ing. None of these methods can stop reverse engineering. Our research topic code
obfuscation [22] is the only technique that make the target software difficult for
reverse engineering and reduce human understandability of the code. As the ex-
ecutable is open to all we can not stop any body from using de-compiling tools
or de-assembler for reverse engineering. But through code obfuscation [21] we are
trying to make it difficult for the tools or humans to understand and to generate
higher level abstraction of the target software without hampering the output the
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result, for which the software is developed.
Other possible way is server side execution [25], trusted native code(eg. code
authentication) [25], legal step on stealing.
1.3 Objective
The objective of this research work is to develop a technique that will prevent
the attackers from dynamic reverse engineering [26] forces them to static reverse
engineering [26] which they can’t execute to trace its execution path and to get
the actual high level code.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
The basic informations to understand code obfuscation is given in Chapter-2,
as Theoretical Background. It contain the definition and classification of code
obfuscation and reverse engineering in software domain, the assumptions and the
environments those are assumed for code obfuscation and the evaluation process
of the obfuscation technique.
Chapter-3 will provide a overview of the related work and research done till now
on code obfuscation. Which will lighten you up with a little deep knowledge about
code obfuscation and help you to understand the needs, the drawbacks and various
way to protect a software by code obfuscation.
Chapter-4 will take you through our proposed technique of code obfuscation with
some basic theoretical knowledge about the technology used and the simulation
and results of our proposed work.
In Chapter-5 the overall work with strength and drawbacks is expressed in the
section Conclusion and the possible future work is described in the Future Scope
section.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Background of Code
Obfuscation
2.1 Introduction
The main target of code obfuscation is to protect the sensitive information of
the software from getting disclosed to the outer world. As the softwares are dis-
tributed in executable form in today’s world, to get the sensitive informations
or information about proprietary or intellectual properties from the executable
reverse engineering is the only technique available in digital market. And code ob-
fuscation is also the only technique that can prevent reverse engineering to some
extent to analyze the target software.
2.2 Threat Model
After developing the software it is assumed that the executable will run on an
untrusted host machine where the attacker have the complete access over the host
machine, like the attacker have administrative access to the operating system, can
add or remove hardware parts from the host machine, have access to the executable
code of the software and to all kind of reverse engineering tool (e.g. disassembler,
debugger) to analyze the code. After analyzing they can reuse any module for
their program or can extract any proprietary algorithm or data structure and
reveal it publicly for the loss of the vendor or insert extra code to get customers’
information by violating the trust factor between vendor and customer.
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2.2.1 Software Distribution Model
Here software distribution model means the various categories of user, who can
use the software. A simple software distribution model consist of four different
participants as follows:
A Software Vendor
They develop the softwares with new ideas and technologies to capture the
market and want to maximize their profits by selling their software products,
in present and in future.
B Legitimate User
These people are ready to pay to use the software which is not pirated and
not malicious for their work. These people are conscious about their private
information from getting damaged or disclosed. They need a trust factor
from the products they are using.
C Illegitimate User
These people have no technical knowledge but want to use the software with
the privileges of a legitimate user without proper compensation. They don’t
need the trust factor.
D Pirates or Attacker
These kinds of people with technical knowledge want to break all the security
measure taken to protect a software code and use that code for their own
software or to make pirated copy of that software for the illegitimate or
legitimate user with minimizing the risk of being caught.
2.2.2 Attacks against Software Intellectual Properties
In the paper “Watermarking, tamper-proofing, and obfuscation-tools for software
protection” [22], the authors defines various attacks against software intellectual
properties using reverse engineering as defined bellow.
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 Software Piracy Attack
Attacker reverse engineers an application, which he has legally purchased
from Vendor, and make pirated or cracked copy removing the vendor’s sig-
nature and sells them to unsuspecting customer in low price. Which will
create loss for the vendor from both profit from selling and the trust factor
with the customers.
Figure 2.1: Software Piracy Attack
 Module Reuse Attack
Attacker reverse engineers an application, which he has legally purchased
from Vendor, in order to reuse one of the modules in his/her own program.
As described in Figure-2.2, the attacker, after reverse engineer, reuse the
code of Comp2 within his own software without developing by his own. This
will create problems for the vendor in business to capture the market.
Figure 2.2: Module Reuse Attack
 Code Alteration Attack
Attacker reverse engineers an application, after legally purchased from Ven-
dor, makes some changes to the code for own profit irrespective the loss of
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vendors or customers and resell the products to the market. As described
in Figure-2.3, the attacker change the code as whenever a user execute the
play() methods of the software as well as the vendor the attacker is also
getting paid by the customer.
Figure 2.3: Code Alteration Attack
2.2.3 Reverse Engineering
Figure 2.4: Process of Reverse Engineering
As described previously the Reverse engineering [8] is the process of analyzing
a target system to uniquely identify the system’s modules and relationships be-
tween them and create a representations of the target system in another form or
at a higher level of abstraction. In the world of software reverse engineering allows
attackers to understand the internal behavior of the executables and extract pro-
prietary algorithms or code sections from it. In Figure-2.4 the reverse engineering
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process is described.
The analysis of reverse engineering can be classified [26] as static reverse engi-
neering and dynamic reverse engineering.
 Static reverse engineering is a technique where the structure of software
executable is analyzed without actually executing it.
Here a attacker can use a disassembler to translate the executable machine
code into a visible, understandable assembly language code including all the
instructions those affects the control flow. From this by manually checking
each instruction attacker can generate the control flow graph from which
the high level abstraction of the software/code-section can be reconstructed
without executing it. It is a hard and tedious job but a possible way and
need expertise of this domain. Static reverse engineering can be carried out
by two ways. One is Linear sweep where attacker is just following each
instruction as encountered one after another but this is very tedious and
error prone technique. Other is Recursive Traversal where the attacker start
with the program entry point and stops at every control flow instruction and
determines possible predecessor and successor and then again continues on
every possible paths. But determining the possible successor of every control
instruction without executing is a very tough and error prone.
 Dynamic reverse engineering is a technique where the attacker execute
the software executable within a debugger [27] to inspect its internal struc-
tures as well as the various execution paths.
For encrypted code it is too hard to identify the key and tracking the code’s
transformation by static analysis. Then with the help of debuggers [27] [6] it
is possible to execute the code step by step to identify the key and to track
the code transformation.
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2.3 Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation technique is to obscure the control, data, layout, design of the
software original implementation and give a semantically same but new imple-
mentation, as described in Figure-2.5, of the target software that make reverse
engineering much harder.
Figure 2.5: Code Obfuscation
2.3.1 Definition of Code Obfuscation
There is no common formal definition for code obfuscation. It is a transformation
method to convert one program into another, which prohibits the same charac-
teristics of the old program. It can also be treated as an encrypted code that is
decrypted prior to execute at runtime. Obfuscated code can be an executables that
contain encrypted sections, and a simple code section to decrypt the encrypted
code section.
According to the authors of the paper “A taxonomy of obfuscating transfor-
mations” [21], the definition of code obfuscation is as follows
Definition : Let T(P) be a transformed program of program P. Then T is the
Obfuscating Technique if T(P) poses the same observable characteristics as P and
T(P) must follows the following conditions:
 If program P does not terminate or has an erroneous termination, then T(P)
may or may not terminate.
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 Else as P terminates successfully, T(P) must terminate with the same out-
come as P.
According to the authors of the paper ”A security architecture for survivability
mechanisms” [28], if T is obfuscating technique that transform the program P into
the obfuscated binary B, then the reverse transformation from B to P will take
much greater effort and time(almost impossible),as T is a one way translator.
2.3.2 Classification of Code Obfuscation
Obfuscation comes in four flavors [21] based on obfuscation target - Layout obfus-
cation, Data obfuscation, Control obfuscation and Preventive transformation.
1 Layout Obfuscation : It refers to obscuring of the software layout by
deleting comments for instance, changing format of the source code, variables
renaming, and the removal debugging information through obscuring the
lexical structure of the program.
2 Data Obfuscation : This prevents the extraction of information from data.
Data obfuscation techniques are array splitting, variable splitting, changing
the scope and lifetime of data etc.
3 Control Obfuscation : This refer to the obscuring of the control flow of the
program. This kind of obfuscation technique mainly of dynamic obfuscation
type based on self modifying code.
4 Preventive Transformation : Depending on debuggers’ or disassemblers’
weaknesses, modify the program such that code itself will force the debugger
or disassembler to fail.
But this classification does not include all types of obfuscation techniques.
Another possible classification is Design Obfuscation [29] which deals with ob-
scuring the design related informations of the software. Like merging and splitting
of code sections or classes, type hiding, will help in obscuring the design intend of
the programs.
14
2.3 Code Obfuscation Theoretical Background of Code Obfuscation
Figure 2.6: Classification of obfuscating transformation
2.3.3 Evaluation of Obfuscation Technique
There are two ways to check the quality [25] of a obfuscation technique as software
engineering not only includes the technological and computational measures, it
also include the human factor for every development. The two quality evaluation
methods are defined bellow.
Analytical Method
Analytical method checks the quality of the obfuscating technique T() depend-
ing upon the parameters of both original/source program P and the obfuscated
program T(P). According to authors of the paper ”A taxonomy of obfuscating
transformation” [21], they are evaluating the quality depending upon three pa-
rameters - potency, resilience and cost.
 Potency : It can be described as - how much obscurity T() adds to P.
Let Pot(P) is the potency measurement of P and Pot(T(P)) is the potency
measurement of T(P) then
TransformationPotency, TPot = Pot(T (P ))/Pot(P )− 1 (2.1)
15
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Figure 2.7: Metrics for quality measurement of the obfuscation technique
Potency for both P and T(P) can be measured by various software complex-
ity metrics defined in Table-2.1.
Table 2.1: Software complexity metrics to measure potency
Metric Name Description Citation
Program Length Pot(P) increase with the number of
operators and operands in P
Halstead [30]
Cyclomatic Complexity Pot(P) increase with the cyclomatic
complexity of P
McCabe [31]
Nested Complexity Pot(P) increase with the nesting lev-
els of the conditionals in P
Harision [32]
 Cost : It is measure by how much computational overhead T() adds to
T(P). It is the execution time penalty and space penalty that the obfuscation
technique incurs on T(P).
If executing T(P) requires exponentially more resources than P then
TransformationCost, TCost = Dear (2.2)
If executing T(P) requires O(np), p>1, more resources than P then
TransformationCost, TCost = Costly (2.3)
If executing T(P) requires O(n), more resources than P then
TransformationCost, TCost = Cheap (2.4)
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If executing T(P) requires O(1), more resources than P then
TransformationCost, TCost = Free (2.5)
 Resilience : It is measured by how difficult is T(P) to break for a de-
obfuscator means how well a T() holds up under attack from a automatic
deobfuscator. Resilience can be measured by summing the total of program-
mer’s effort and deobfuscator’s effort [21].
Programmer Effort (PEff) - The amount of time require by the
programmer to build the automatic deobfuscator to regenerate P from T(P).
Deobfuscator Effort (DeoEff) - The amount of execution time and
space required for the automated deobfuscator to deobfuscate the trans-
formed program.
If P can not be constructed from T(P), means some information from P is
removed in T(P) at the time of obfuscation, then
TransformationResilience, TRes = OneWay (2.6)
Otherwise
TransformationResilience, TRes = Res(PEff + DeoEff) (2.7)
Figure 2.8: Measure of resilience
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Empirical Method
The main target of code obfuscation is to protect the proprietary code sections
or algorithms from unauthorized analysis and in reverse engineering the last step
of analysis is totally depends on human effort [25] which can not be measured by
any metrics. For this we need to perform empirical research on a group of people
like programmers, hackers or crackers, students.
2.4 Summary
Throughout this chapter, what ever is discussed is just to create a basic under-
standing for this research work. For more details you can go through the papers
and websites refereed throughout the paper.
For some more interesting informations you can have a look to the website of
Prof. Christian Collberg [21] [22] [13] of University of Arizona, the website of ”The
International Obfuscated C Code Contest”, the website of University of Florida on
”Obfuscated C Code”, the website of Princeton University on ”Obfuscated code”
and so many hacking websites those are available on Internet. These are some
unnamed references of this paper.
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Literature Review
There are number of techniques and their implementation have been evolved by
many researchers since past decade based on protection against static and dy-
namic reverse engineering. Each approach has different techniques and targets
depends on static or dynamic reverse engineering like control flow flattering [28],
obfuscation using signals [33] [34], dynamic code mutation [35] [36], binary level
obfuscation [29], protective transformation [37] [38] and others.
3.1 Review of related work
Protection of software based survivability mechanisms - 2001
In this paper [28] authors used control flow obfuscation by the use of control
flow flattering technique to confuse the disassembler about the execution sequence
of the program. Here the researchers first divided their program into basic blocks
depending upon the high level control structure. Then this control structure is
replaced with ”if-then-goto” statements. After this the construction is changed in
such a way that the target address of goto will be determined dynamically after
the execution of each block and will be stored in switch variable and a switch
statement, depending on the value of the switch variable, determines which block
to be executed next. In simple words each basic blocks will have the same pre-
decessor and successor block, where basic block will calculate the switch variable,
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then control will go to the successor block which will give the control back to the
predecessor block and then depending on the switch variable predecessor block
will determine which basic block will be executed next.
Though this is very good dynamic control flow obfuscation but with the in-
crease of program and input size the requirements for memory and executing time
will increase and above all modern debuggers can provide a rough diagram of the
control flow by executing each instruction at assembly level one at time.
Software protection through dynamic code mutation - 2006
The researchers of this paper [36] implement a dynamic code obfuscation tech-
nique that will remove some set of code which will be restored at run time. To
implement this idea they are using three extra code module - stub, edit script and
edit engine. First thing they are doing is the identification of basic blocks, then
they are removing a set of code from a basic block and put the restoring informa-
tions in a edit script. Afterwards they include a stub, which will have the address
of the corresponding edit script, at the beginning of that block and desperately
put some confusing erroneous code on place of removed set of code. At the time of
execution stub will be executed first and transfer the control to edit engine with
the address of corresponding edit script. Then according to edit script the edit
engine will restore the original set of code at position of the erroneous set of code.
This method is implemented in two ways by the researchers of this paper. One is
One-Pass Mutation where each functions or basic blocks will have their own edit
script. Other one is Cluster-Based Mutation where a group of similar functions
will have a single edit script.
The major disadvantage of this technique is the stub section is always be in
highlight, that will draw attention of the attacker. Other disadvantage is after
restoring, the original code is fully exposed to the debugger or attacker.
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Binary obfuscation using signals - 2007
Here [33] the researchers also give a new technique of control flow obfuscation
by hiding the control flow information of a program using signal, which are used
carry information between operating system and information. This research work
is based on the replacement of every control instruction at binary level (eg. JMP,
RET, CALL) with trap signals like SIGILL for illegal instruction, SIGSEGV for
segmentation violation and SIGFPE for floating point exception. It first identify
the the control instruction, then divides the code-before and code-after segment
of the control instruction. After this the control instruction is replaced with a
trap instruction and some bogus code is inserted between the trap instruction
and the code-after segment. Then the user defined signal handlers are installed
within the program with a special table that will contains the actual instruction
for corresponding generated signals. At runtime when the trap signal will executed
the control will go to the operating system’s corresponding signal handlers, then
the control will be transfered to user-defined signal handler for the corresponding
signal. Then the user-define signal handler will execute the corresponding code
and then transfer the control to the code-after segment.
The one disadvantage of this technique is the control instruction is available
within the user-defined signal handler. If the attacker can identify the signal han-
dler, he can identify the control instruction by analyzing the signal handler.
Mimimorphism: a new approach to binary code obfuscation - 2010
In this paper [39] the authors give a totally different kind of obfuscation tech-
nique based on mimic function that has three phases - a digesting phase for Huff-
man tree building, an encoding phase that use Huffman decoding technique and
a decoding phase that use Huffman encoding technique. Here the mimimorphism
technique use mimic function of higher order which differ in digesting phase from
regular mimic function by building a collection of Huffman trees for better mimicry
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and a mimimorphic engine,that include all the three phases, is added to the obfus-
cated program to restore the original code at run time. Here, in Digesting phase,
from the executable with help of an assembler for each assembly instruction with
all the parameters and the frequency of occurrence those parameters are stored
and all the instruction is also get stored with a unique id and with the frequency
of their occurrence, after this a Huffman tree for each instruction is created de-
pending on their parameters frequency. At encoding phase this technique use the
Huffman decoding operation based on the Huffman trees generated earlier in di-
gesting phase and output a completely different assembly code that will convert
into a binary with the help of an assembler. At execution time of the new binary
code the mimimorphic engine apples its decoding function on the binary, that
use the Huffman encoding operation, depending on the Huffman trees generated
earlier to restore the original program for execution.
Here the binary code that will be distributed cant be reverse engineer statically
but it includes the mimimorphic engine, the decoder with the Huffman trees with
unobfuscated status. This may reveal the original code with dynamic analysis
and also encoding and decoding the whole program is very time consuming when
program size will increase.
Mobile agent protection with self-modifying code - 2011
This paper [35] introduces a light weight but self-modifying code based tech-
nique at binary level. The proposed obfuscation technique of the this paper cam-
ouflaged the control instructions with normal instructions or with other control
instructions. This method defines each control instruction as a candidate block,
the code section before the candidate block is named as preceding block and the
code section afterwards is as succeeding block. At the time of obfuscation this
technique replace the control instruction (for example JMP instruction) at the
candidate block with normal instruction (for example MOV instruction) and add
a modifying block to its preceding block and add a restoring block to its succeeding
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block. The modifying block performs some AND-OR operations on the address of
the candidate block to restore the original instruction at run time. After execution
of the candidate block when control goes to the succeeding block, then restoring
block again perform some AND-OR operations the address of the candidate block
and restore the camouflaged instruction again in the candidate block at runtime.
The obfuscated code developed by this method will not be too much bigger
than the original one, as no extra code section is add, instead 2-4 simple binary
level code is added to the original binary one. This kind of obfuscation is very hard
to be found by static reverse engineering and make the analysis error prone. But
the original is exposed temporarily at the time of execution which can be detected
by dynamic reverse engineering with the help of any debugger [27] [6] and also the
modifying and restoring block can be identified by step-in execution(execute one
instruction at a time) within the debugger.
Branch obfuscation using code mobility and signal - 2012
This research work [34] provide a obfuscation technique where resilience [21]
is one-way means the original program can not be reconstructed from the obfus-
cated one. On the basis of the paper “Binary obfuscation using signals” [33] the
researchers of this paper build their work. They are also using the trap instruction
in place of the control instruction, that they want to be obfuscated. In the same
way of the base paper [33] they removed the control instruction and put a trap
instruction with bogus codes afterwards. When the trap instruction will execute
depending on the generated signal control will transfer to operating system, then
to the corresponding installed user-define signal handler. Here the signal handler
will communicate to a remote trusted server/machine by passing the value of the
actual condition variable to know the next code section that will going to be ex-
ecuted next. On receiving the value of the condition variable the server generate
the corresponding result and pass it to the signal handler, which will then pass the
control to the next executing block depending on value of the result. Here they
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are not providing the complete executable code to the customer. They are remov-
ing some information from the provided binary one and add server-side execution
of the removed information, code obfuscation technique is only used to hide the
actual control instruction form the attacker.
This a hybrid method of code obfuscation and server-side execution. As some
code is removed from the provided binary, the original code can never be recon-
structed from the binary with the help of any kind of reverse engineering. But
the performance of this code totally depends upon the connectivity of between
the two machine. If the network bandwidth is too low or there is no connectivity
between the two machine, this implementation is totally worthless.
Potent and stealthy control flow obfuscation by stack based self-modifying
code - 2013
Here [29] the researchers developed a stronger new obfuscation technique based
on the paper “Mobile agent protection with self-modifying code” [35] described
earlier. On the previous paper they are just trying to hide the control instruction
but the address where the control will be transferred is still available after camou-
flaged. Here the researchers have shown a way to hide the address also as a local
data to that function, which will be stored on the stack section of data area. In
this research work the researchers take executable machine code and then generate
its corresponding assembly code. Then they select the control instruction to be
obfuscated. Lets take they are going to obfuscate a JMP instruction(an assembly
instruction for unconditional jump with a address parameter). So to store the
address in the stack they are just extending the size of stack that will always be
allocated at the starting point of the function. After this before obfuscating the
instruction they stored the jump address in the stack and then replaced the JMP
instruction with a normal instruction and add an extra instruction in the modify-
ing block after the de-obfuscation instructions to restore the address at run time
and an extra instruction to restoring block to remove the address at run time,
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before the re-obfuscation instructions.
This method provide a code obfuscation mechanism that is to hard to be an-
alyzed by static reverse engineering as both address and the instruction is not
visible until the function stores its stack onto the memory. This thing also make it
hard for dynamic reverse engineering. But in modern debuggers [5] [4] [6] [27] if we
execute the obfuscated binary with the step-in (execute one instruction at a time)
execution it will shows all possible values of every registers and stack pointer, local
and global variable values used at that moment.
An anti-reverse engineering guide - 2008 [ONLINE]
This is a article at ”Code Project” website [37] [38] by Josh jackson. In this
article he has provided various anti debugging technique based on facility we can
get from the operating system and and the status of a program’s environment
variables. Though most of them are only for windows operating system, it is very
helpful. Hare he has shown how to disable the interrupt signals to stop the step-
in execution of the debuggers. Some technique have been shown to detect the
presence of debugger by the code itself, depending on which code can crash itself
or give erroneous result or correct result.
unsigned long NtGlobalFlags = 0 ;
a sm v o l a t i l e (
”movl %%f s : 0 x30 , %%eax ; ”
”movl 0x68(%%eax ) , %%eax ; ”
: ”=a” ( NtGlobalFlags ) ) ;
This is one of that code which can check the presence of debugger by checking
program’s environmental variable like
 FLG HEAP ENABLE TAIL CHECK,
 FLG HEAP ENABLE FREE CHECK,
 FLG HEAP VALIDATE PARAMETERS.
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If all of these are set means the program is executing within a debugger on windows
platform. These are some tricky undocumented facility of windows operating
systems are providing.
But the drawback is that when we execute on a cross platform environment(eg.
executing a windows application on linux with the help of wine application) this
kind of tricky code will not work, and debugger can easily debugged the target
program.
3.2 Motivation
These are the some of the related those have been studied on code obfuscation.
Till now the main trend of code obfuscation is to stop static reverse engineering.
In the case of static reverse engineering, I found the binary level obfuscation is
more tough to analyze, as assembly level code is hard to understand and also no
compiler optimization will be there if some dead code or some extended code is
there for obfuscation. But in modern debuggers, the step by step execution of
code can reveal the obfuscated instruction if code is throughly analyzed with all
registers and stack & heap values.
All of these methods either exposed to dynamic reverse engineering or static
reverse engineering and some of them are exposed to cross platform debugging. In
this research work, the motive is to implement a obfuscation technique that will
extend the security measures to all the mentioned debugging techniques.
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4.1 Introduction
The proposed method of this research work motivated by the level of obfuscation
against the dynamic reverse engineering. The idea of the proposed method de-
veloped here only to stop dynamic reverse engineering where to stop the static
reverse engineer the method stated in the paper “Mobile agent protection with
self-modifying code” [35] is implemented. The proposed method, depending on
the general workings of debugger, puts some conditions which will prohibit the de-
bugger [6] [27] from debugging dynamically and force him towards static reverse
engineering. Where the method implemented in the referred paper [35] will make
the static analyzing much tougher.
4.2 Assumptions
In the domain of software protection the assumption is simple and straight. Where
attacker can have only the executable(in binary) of the target program but can
have complete access to the host system’s hardware and operating system and only
using the reverse engineering technique with debuggers or disassembler. While the
developers have complete access to the program’s high level source code, to the
machine level code and also have proper mappings of obfuscated code positions of
the target program.
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4.3 Proposed Technique
Code obfuscation using code splitting with self-modifying
code :
To stop dynamic reverse engineering it is taking into account the working principle
of debuggers [5] [6] [27]. Depending on this the proposed technique will split
the original code in two main separate program which will communicate through
shared memory and one more program for starting the client on server’s call.
Among this two main programs user can interact with only one program, the
server program, where the proprietary code section will be in the other program,
the client program. Our main technique prohibit the client program from getting
executed under the debugger, so our binary level obfuscated proprietary code can
not be debugged dynamically. The basic idea is: when a debugger try to execute a
program it will start the target program as its child program. But before starting
the target program it will start also many other program simultaneously to inspect
the target program.
 So the debugger can’t analyze every instruction on occurrence until the it
starts the target program as its child or thread.
 And it is also possible to check the parent process id of any program from
the program itself.
Depending on the design is done in such a way that the server program will
create the client program as a zombie process (in linux environment whose parent
process id is 1 means the INIT Process) to stop the execution of the client within
the debugger.
4.3.1 Basics behind the proposed technique
This section will give you little bit of highlights on the working principle [40] of
debuggers and shared memory for inter process communication [41] [42] and little
bit of x86 architecture [43] [44] to understand the binary level obfuscation defined
by the paper ”Mobile agent protection with self-modifying code” [35].
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Debugger’s working principle
The target of a debugger is the complete analyze of the target program. For
complete analyze, debugger have to check all the content machine level instruction,
all variables and functions, all registers’ and stack values [40] [7].
A CPU view consist of a disassembler pane for complete assembly level view
of machine code(binary code), a register pane for register values, memory
dump pane to display the content of any memory location, flag pane to
display all the set flags.
B Memory view used for checking the variables, functions, types and their
corresponding virtual address with the memory layout of the complete pro-
gram, like different code section, data section, stack section of the program
in execution.
C Stack view shows the calling and return trace of all the functions and all
local variables accessed with the stack virtual address.
D Break Point view show the all breakpoints introduced by the developers
or the attackers.
After setting up all these environment debugger, with the help of the operating
system, either spawn the target program or debuggee with full control on the de-
buggee or attach itself with the debuggee for getting all the status information
when ever the debuggee stops its execution depending on breakpoints or on error
or on successful execution. On the first method the step by step execution of every
instruction is possible but not possible with the second method.
x86 Architecture
x86 is a backward compatible instruction set architecture family based on Intel
8086 CISC (Complex Instruction Set Computing) processors with 8 general pur-
pose registers and 6 segment registers of 16 bit or 32 bit or 64 bit.
x86 General Purpose Register (as 32 bit register symbol)
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1 Accumulator(EAX), used for arithmetic operation.
2 Base register(EBX), used as a pointer to a data.
3 Counter register(ECX), used in shift/rotate instruction and loop statements.
4 Data register(EDX), used in arithmetic and I/O operation.
5 Stack Pointer(ESP), used as the TOP of stack memory.
6 Stack Base Pointer(EBP), used as a pointer to the base of stack memory.
7 Source Index Register(ESI), a pointer to a source in stream operation.
8 : Destination Index register(EDI), a pointer to a destination in stream op-
eration.
x86 Segment Register
1 Stack Segment (SS) : used as a pointer to stack
2 Code Segment (CS) : used as a pointer to the start of text/code section
3 Data Segment (DS) : used as a pointer to data section in memory
4 Extra Segment (ES) : used as a pointer to extra data
5 F Segment (ES) : used as a pointer to more extra data
6 G Segment (GS) : used as a pointer to still more extra data
Shared Memory for Inter Process Communication
In shared memory inter process communication model where one process creates
a common memory location, which other processes can access by attaching them-
selves with the shared location as shown in Figure-4.1. Here we use share memory
as we divide one program in two co-operating process and once shared memory is
created the communication between two process is fast even for huge size of data.
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Figure 4.1: Shared Memory for Inter Process Communication
4.3.2 Design of the proposed technique
This proposed technique is based on design [29] and preventive [21] obfuscation
techniques by dividing the target program in three part.
 Server : Holds the code for user interaction.
 Client-Start-up : Start the client on server call.
 Client : Holds the proprietary code section.
This division will be done manually, it depends upon the developer. After this
division it will make the server to create a share memory that client can access.
After the creation of share memory server will start a client-start-up program,
which will terminate after starting the client. This technique make the client to
execute as a zombie process(whose parent is the INIT process). Then the client
will check whether its running with parent process id as 1 nor not. If it is a zombie
process then only the client will attach itself to the share memory location, after
successful attaching it will collect data from share memory, calculate result, write
result back to share memory and will terminate successfully. After collecting the
result from share memory, server will execute the rest code section. A generalized
diagram is described the Figure-4.2 for the overall understanding of the design.
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This obfuscation technique useful to restrict the debugger from dynamic analysis
of the obfuscated executable.
Figure 4.2: Design of proposed technique
4.4 Implementation
Implementation environment
In this research work the implementation of the proposed technique is based on
Linux environment. The Linux environment is developed by setting up a virtual
machine hosted by VMware Workstation on Windows platform.
 Operating System: Debian GNU / Linux Kali Linux 1.0
 System Confuguration:
– Processor Model : Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 - 3632QM
– CPU GHz : 2.20 GHz
– Cache Size : 6144 KB
– Core : 2 (on VMware)
– Memory : 2 GB (on VMware)
– HDD : 30 GB (on VMware)
 Compiler: gcc version 4.7.2
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 Debugger: EDB Debugger(Evan’s Debugger)
 Programming Language: ANSI C
A detailed design with a small example
For better understanding a very simple program is taken here, that will dis-
play the sum of first one million natural numbers (1 to 1000000) with help of
a “sum˙million()” function which implements the logic using a simple for loop in
C language and our target is to hide the implementation of “sum˙million()” func-
tion. To do so, first thing is the design level preventive obfuscation technique,
that are proposed to stop dynamic reverse engineering and the next is machine
level or binary level self modifying code [35] implementation to make it harder for
static reverse engineering.
In design level obfuscation it will create total three different program - first one
is the server program to interact with the user and to create the shared memory,
second the middle element is the client-start-up program, which will be called
by the server to start the client as zombie process (means the server will start
the execution of this program and after starting the execution of the client it will
terminate itself) and third one is the client program which will hold and execute the
“sum˙million()” function. Figure-4.4 and Figure-4.3 describe the whole function
visually with comparison between the obfuscated code normal code.
Figure 4.3: Design of Control flow between the Programs
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According to McCabe’s Cyclomatic Complexity formula [31], the complexity
measure for this two program is being calculated . For the normal program the
value is 4 where as for the obfuscated one the value is 7 implies that the obfuscated
one is more tough to test, to analyze, to maintain and to understand.
So the measure of potency, according to Equation-2.1 defined in Chapter-2,
for normal program is Pot(P)=3 and for obfuscated program is Pot(T(P))=7.
So Transformation Potency(TPot) is 2.33 (greater than Zero) implies that the
obfuscated one is harder to understand.
Figure 4.4: Design of Control flow between the Programs
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And it also includes the inter process communication. This implies that the
measure of resilience of the obfuscated program is “Full” according to the Figure-
2.8 described in Chapter-2.
After the design level obfuscation the proposed technique will modify the bi-
nary code of the client program, in the way it is stated in the paper [35], to make
it harder for static reverse engineering. Here in the implementation, only the pre-
ventive code section (checking of parent id) and the for loop to calculate the sum
of the client program is obfuscated. On these sections only the jump instructions
is modified into move instructions, which will be changed to the original jump
code at runtime and after the execution of the jump instruction that will again
changed to the move instruction on the go as described in the Figure-4.5 bellow.
Figure 4.5: Design of binary level obfuscation
Table 4.1: Execution Time of the program : Sum of First One Million Natural
Number
Original Program Obfuscated Program
real 0 m 0.011 s 0 m 0.021 s
user 0 m 0.008 s 0 m 0.012 s
sys 0 m 0.000 s 0 m 0.004 s
The result of Table-4.1 is obtained by running both the program with the
“time” command in Linux. From this table we can calculate the time-cost factor
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by considering only the “user” and “sys” time, as real time is depends on all other
programs those are running at that time.
 Original Program (P) : user + sys = 0 m 0.008 s
 Obfuscated Program (T(P)) : user + sys = 0 m 0.016 s
 Time-cost factor is { time( T(P) )/time( P ) } = 2
From this factor it can be concluded that depending on the size of input this
result is not so high. As both the program has same complexity level O(n) for
original program and O(n+c) for the obfuscated one, which is equivalent to O(n),
concludes the Time-cost factor as “Cheap” according to the Equation-2.4 defined
in Chapter-2 as stated in the paper [21].
The informations about memory requirements of the executables are also collected
by running them with the “size” command in Linux, shown in Table-4.2 and Table-
4.3. According to the Table-4.3 total space require for the obfuscated program
Table 4.2: Memory Requirements for the Original Program
text data bss total
size ( in byte ) 1281 292 04 1577
Table 4.3: Memory Requirements for the Obfuscated Program
text data bss total
size of Server ( in byte ) 1845 316 20 2181
size of Client-Start-Up ( in byte ) 1588 308 04 1900
size of Client ( in byte ) 1981 320 04 2305
is the summation of space requirement for the three programs which is equal to
6386 bytes. So the Space-cost factor { space( T(P) )/space( P ) } is equal to
4.049, which is much higher. According to space-cost our proposed method can
be concluded as “Costly”. But today’s world space requirement will not create a
big problem.
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Testing of Preventive Transformation
Testing of the preventive transformation is done with the program “Sum of first
One Million Natural Number” and EDB Debugger(Evan’s Debugger) [27] on Linux
platform. As client program can only run as zombie process, whose parent can be
the INIT process only, so
 If debugger execute its as its child, client will crash.
Figure 4.6: Screen shot : Crash testing
 Suppose the debugger attach itself with the client by calling the debugger
loaded client version from the client-start-up program. But then after the
Figure 4.7: Screen shot : Failure testing
the termination of client-start-up, debugger will lost its control over the
environment variables it needed from the operating system to start and
to debug a program, as debugger itself is a zombie process now. Here the
program is terminated forcefully which is cleared from time shown in Figure-
4.7.
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 If attacker change the client-start-up program such that it will not terminate
after starting the client, then also client will crash as parent process is not
the INIT process. As shown in the first Screen shot Figure-4.6.
 The debugger can not also debug the INIT process as debugger itself is the
child of the INIT process.
Figure 4.8: Screen shot : A try to debug INIT process
 The only way to execute the client is to remove the code for which the
client get crashed if its parent is not the INIT process. For this debugger
have statically analyze the code but the binary level obfuscation by the self-
modifying code section make it much harder for the attacker.
Testing of efficiency of our technique on some sorting programs
Here some testings are also done with common sorting programs - Bubble sort,
Insertion sort, Heap sort and Quick sort. All the programs have been tested with
a array of 100000 unsorted integers generated with the “rand()” of C library, with
the default seed value as ONE, for both the original and obfuscated program. Here
the first thing for any program is to initialize the array with the “rand()”, then
sorting of that array.
For obfuscation first implementation is the code splitting part for design level
preventive obfuscation against dynamic analysis, then the modification of the bi-
nary code to make it harder for the static reverse engineering.
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As this technique is based on inter process communication, according to the
paper [21] the measure of resilience is “FULL”. For detail description please
go back to the Figure-2.8 described in Chapter-2. Potency of each program is
measured with the McCabe’s Cyclomatic Complexity, shown in Table-4.4.
Table 4.4: Measure of Potency
Program Potency of Original Program, Pot( P ) Potency of Obfuscated Code, Pot( T(P) ) Transformation Potency, TPot
Bubble sort 7 15 1.143
Insertion sort 7 15 1.143
Heap sort 13 22 0.692
Quick sort 9 16 0.778
The measure of Cost in terms of memory space requirements and execution time.
Table-4.5 shows the space-cost factor and Table-4.6 shows the time-cost factor.
Table 4.5: Measure of Space-cost Factor (SIZE : byte)
Original Size Obfuscated Size Total Size Space-Cost Factor
Bubble Server 2594
Client-start-up 1844Bubble sort 1926
Bubble Client 2717
6155 3.196
Insertion Server 2594
Client-start-up 1848Insertion sort 1896
Insertion Client 2695
7137 3.764
Heap Server 2858
Client-start-up 1844Heap sort 2356
Heap Client 2876
7578 3.216
Quick Server 2594
Client-start-up 1844Quick sort 2224
Quick Client 2979
7417 3.335
Table 4.6: Measure of Time-cost Factor (TIME : SECOND)
Program
Original program Obfuscated Program
Time-cost factor
real user sys real user sys
Bubble sort 105.894 101.240 0.032 113.533 104.008 0.056 1.028
Insertion sort 20.337 15.772 0.020 22.419 17.616 0.040 1.118
Heap sort 4.973 0.148 0.040 5.024 0.161 0.064 1.197
Quick sort 4.780 0.100 0.056 4.974 0.128 0.080 1.333
Here for Table-4.6, running each program for 8 times, with the Linux “time”
command, the average time for each section has been taken excluding the highest
value and the lowest value. For the measurement of time-cost factor, only “user”
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and “sys” times are taken into account as “real” time is influenced with all other
programs, those are running at that time. If Time(P) is the total of “user” and
“sys” time of the original program and Time(T(P)) is the total of “user” and “sys”
time of the obfuscated program, then Time-cost factor = {Time(T(P))/Time(P)}.
For checking the change of time with input data size, the size of the array has been
varied from 10 to 100000 for the bubble sort program. As the sort time taken by
bubble sort is much higher than all other program for both original code and
obfuscated code. So the change in time will more prominent for bubble sort.
Table 4.7: Measure of Time-cost Factor for Bubble sort
Array size
Original ( in Sec ) Obfuscated ( in Sec )
Time cost Factor
real user sys real user sys
10 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 -
100 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 -
1000 0.018 0.008 0.000 0.024 0.012 0.004 2
10000 1.475 1.048 0.000 1.492 1.060 0.012 1.023
100000 105.894 101.240 0.032 113.533 104.008 0.056 1.028
For this table also only only “user” and “sys” time are considered as real has
influence of other running program in the system on that time.
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Conclusion
5.1 Achievements
Above all descriptions, results make you feel that code obfuscation is reducing the
performance of your program or software. Yes it is. But if you need protection
and security against piracy, code theft and other attacks you have to introduce
some security measures, you have to except the trade off between the performance
and level of security. This research technique uses a combination of code split-
ting and binary level obfuscation. Where code splitting is threatened by static
reverse engineering and binary level obfuscation is threatened by dynamic reverse
engineering. While the strength of them is just opposite, so the combination of
them in the proposed technique provides a lot more security level by making all
types of reverse engineering much harder for attacker and debugging tools while
performance is reduced by 15% on an average for these small programs. For large
programs(time consuming) it will not matter too much performance loss. As we
can see for bubble sort performance reduction is just 2.8% while reduction of 33.3%
for quick sort.
According to the proposal it can be concluded that the combination of code
splitting and insertion of self-modifying code, while complementing each other
against all kind of reverse engineering, provides a much stronger but lighter (in
terms of performance reduction in execution) obfuscation techniques available to-
day.
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5.2 Limitation & Future Scope
After more than one decade of research on code obfuscation by all the researchers
through out the world, none of the proposed technique is fully compatible with
parallel processing where code or data are being shared between multiple threads.
This proposed research technique is not also to much suitable for parallel pro-
cessing. It can support parallel processing until only the client code section is
written in parallel otherwise reduction in performance will be huge as for, every
thread have to create their own shared memory section and it also need much
more effort from the programmers for synchronizing each thread for accessing the
shared memory data. One possible way, according to me, is that implementation
of software transactional memory (STM) at binary level with the self-modifying
code, which is much harder to implement, need in depth knowledge of assembly
language and above all it will be hardware specific till now as lots of processor
does not support STM.
———- END ———-
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